'Four in One Night'
The stretch of discourse presented in Appendix One comes from a relatively large-scale project on the construction of masculine identities (Edley and Wetherell, 1995; Wetherell and Edley, 1998; Wetherell, 1994) . Part of this project involved an intensive reflexive ethnography (Atkinson, 1989) conducted in and around the sixth form common room of a single sex boys' independent school in the United Kingdom and included interviews with small groups of white 17-18 year old male students. Each group of three was interviewed around eight times, meeting for an hour each week with the interviewer (Nigel Edley) , for a period of approximately two to three months. The aim of this ethnography was to examine the construction of middle class masculine identities in one institutional site and the interviews covered aspects of the young men's daily lives, social relations within the common room, their anticipations of their future working and domestic lives, relationships with women and with male friends, sexuality, popular culture, feminism, homophobia, masculine stereotypes, and so on.
The material in Appendix One comes from the fifth session of one of these small group interviews (with Group C) around half-way into the session. The participants (Phil, Aaron and Paul) and the young women referred to in the conversation, but not the interviewer, have been given pseudonyms. This extract begins with the interviewer introducing a new topic of conversation, picking up on a previous but unexplicated allusion to some events involving Aaron during the weekend.
Extract One

1
Nigel: Okay yeah tell me about going with four people in one 2 night=
This formulation is heard as a request to Aaron for a description of the events which Phil eventually supplies with and on behalf of . The description concerns Aaron's behaviour at a pub on the Friday night and at a party on the Saturday night and the nature of his involvement with four different young women. The discussion of this topic prompted by Nigel Edley (which in fact continues for many more turns than reproduced in Appendix One) moves on to consider the evaluation of the event (Lines 76 to 93).
Extract Two
73
Phil: So that like took me aback somewhat (0.3) so that was 74 a good weekend for you 75 (.) 76 Nigel: Is that good?
After some discussion of the 'stick' or criticism Aaron received from his friends, Nigel intervenes once more to re-focus the discussion on the morality of Aaron's actions. After Phil and Aaron discuss Aaron's position on "the moral low ground" the fourth participant in the discussion (Paul) is invited into the conversation and asked for his views. The interviewer's questions key into two very pervasive and inter-related discursive activitiesdescribing events (formulating their nature) and accounting for and evaluating those events.
Extract Three
Extract Four
There is, of course, an enormous amount of interest in these data for the discourse analyst, including, for instance, the delicate business of telling a story on behalf of someone else, the large amount of ventriloquising and reported speech, its use and discursive functions in Before examining these features, however, I will first set up conversation analysis as a potential analytic frame for this material, focusing in particular on Schegloff's (1991; writings on method and context, and then some post-structuralist writings (Laclau, 1993; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 1987; Mouffe, 1992; Shapiro, 1992) as an alternative frame.
How might each perspective understand discourse of this kind? What concepts are offered for analysing this talk?
Conversation Analysis
In traditional sociology, or in traditional social psychology for that matter, a satisfactory analysis of the kind of material found in Appendix One would relate the patterns found to some external social cause or some internal psychological motivation. The interest would be in Aaron's actual actions as these can be deduced from descriptions. In explanation it might be sufficient, for example, to say that Aaron's behaviour ('four in one night') is caused by his attitudes towards women and his internalisation of gender ideologies or perhaps could be caused by his developmental stage as an adolescent experimenting with sexuality.
What distinguishes the analytic frame of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, of course, is their disinterest in this question of external social or natural causes, and their rejection of the side-step which takes the analyst immediately from the conversation to something seen as real and determining behind the conversation (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984 Conversation analysts study how social organisation is accomplished in talk. According to Duranti and Goodwin (1992, p. 192) , the study of conversation "permits detailed analysis of how participants employ general, abstract procedures to build the local particulars of the events they are engaged in." Such procedures, however, are seen as flexibly applied situated social practices rather than prescriptive, all or nothing, rules. Procedures might include, for
instance, competence at turn-taking, recognition of sequential organisation and conditional relevance such as that a question, for example, typically demands an answer (Schegloff, 1968) .
Analysis proceeds from the general observation that in talk participants display to each other, as they perform their own contributions, their understanding of the setting and context, and their grasp of the emergent activities. Members of society display what they know -their practical reasoning skills and competencies. It is possible to see, for example, how utterances are designed to do tasks while the replies or turns of other participants demonstrate how those utterances are intersubjectively understood and are taken up (Sacks, 1992) .
The focus of conversation analysis is thus on the reflexive accomplishment of conversation.
Conversation analysis attempts to provide a good description of conversational activities but is also an explanation of those activities in the limited sense that description depends on a particular view of the nature of social organisation and social order. Schegloff's (1991; Laclau and Mouffe (1987) ask their readers to consider the activity of building a brick wall.
The entire activity of building is made up of speech acts ('pass me that brick') and physical acts (placing brick on top of brick) yet both kinds of acts acquire their meaning in relation to each other and to the socially constructed and stabilised system of relations we recognise as 'building a brick wall'. They point out that not only is the 'being' of objects (such as bricks) established in this way, and therefore what these objects are for humans, but also the character, identity and the 'being' of social agents. Thus, again to use one of their examples, the 'discourse of football' establishes that a certain spherical object is a 'ball' while some bits of metal and netting become 'the goal'. But, equally, any person who takes up a defined stance in relation to the spherical object and bits of wood becomes a 'player', or a 'goal-keeper'.
In other words, Laclau and Mouffe conceive the social space as a whole as discursive. Or, as Laclau (1993, p. 341) puts it, "(s)ociety can ... be understood as a vast argumentative texture through which people construct their reality". In line with his inclusive concept of discourse, and the examples above, Laclau is at pains to stress that the 'argumentative fabric' from which social realities are constructed is both verbal and nonverbal. For Laclau and Mouffe it makes no sense to distinguish between the discursive and the extra-discursive or talk and the worldthere is rather an unceasing human activity of making meanings (the horizon of discourse) from which social agents and objects, social institutions and social structures emerge configured in ever-changing patterns of relations.
As good post-structuralists, Laclau and Mouffe argue that signification (and thus the social) is an infinite play of differences. Meaning can never be finally fixed; it is always in flux, unstable and precarious. The being of objects and people can never be encapsulated, once and for all, in a closed system of differences. Laclau and Mouffe balance, however, this emphasis on openness and non-finalizability, the 'radical relationalism' of the social, with claims about a process of organisation rather vaguely described as 'discursive articulation' or the forming of 'nodal points', 'discursive clumps' or 'ensembles'. Things recognised as people and objects and the relations between these entities are pulled together or emerge in stable forms which may last for quite long historical periods. Power is recognisable in the formation of these articulations and nodal points. Indeed power seems to be the capacity to 'articulate' and to make those articulations not only 'stick' but become hegemonic and pervasive. The influence of both Foucault and Gramsci on Laclau and Mouffe's formulations is evident here.
For Laclau and Mouffe, people or social agents are both passive and active. On the one hand, people seem to provide the energy required for meaning-making and articulation. On the other hand, as Mouffe argues, the individual subject becomes de-centered, not the author of his/her own discursive activity and not the origin point of discourse.
We can ... conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of "subject positions" that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of over-determination and displacement. The "identity" of such a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions and dependent on specific forms of identification. It is therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, homogeneous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through which it is constituted within various discursive formations. (1992, p.372) .
This position has important implications for traditional notions of ideology, false consciousness and objective group interests. The concept of false consciousness assumes that social agents have real or true identities (as members of the proletariat, for example) and real or true interests which go with those social identities which they may misperceive, simply not recognise or which can be obscured and invisible. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe (1987) argue that identity and interests do not operate in this way, in advance of social and discursive construction. Rather, "'interests' ... are a social product and do not exist independently of the consciousness of the agents who are their bearers." (1987, p. 118) . Interests emerge from discursive configurations and must be mobilised and made discursively available.
In Shapiro's writings it is possible to find an explication of Foucault's notion of genealogy which helps articulate the kind of analytic activity which might emerge from these formulations. Shapiro argues that "(i)ntelligible exchanges are always situated. ... the contextmeaning relation subsumes a complex history of struggle in which one or more ways of establishing contexts and their related utterances has vanquished other competing possibilities" (1992, p.38). The task of genealogy, then, and analysis, is to render strange usual or habitual ways of making sense, to locate these sense making methods historically and to interrogate their relation to power.
To return now to the material in Appendix One. There are two claims I wish to make in relation to these data which bear on the analytic frames presented above. First, in contrast to post-structuralist accounts of the decentered subject, but commensurate with conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, I want to emphasise the highly occasioned and situated nature of subject positions and the importance of accountability rather than 'discourse' per se in fueling the take up of positions in talk. Detailed analysis of conversation allows a different view of 'constituted identities'.
Second, I want to argue that for a complete rather than merely 'technical' analysis of this material it is necessary to consider the forms of institutionalised intelligibility, to use Shapiro's term, which comprise members' methods. I will suggest that the way in which Schegloff marks the boundaries around conversation is unhelpful and unproductive. The more inclusive notion of discourse found in post-structuralist writing and exemplified in Laclau's notion of the argumentative texture of social life provides a better grounding for analysis. In developing both these points I will draw on analytic concepts familiar from social psychological discourse analyses such as variability , ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1987) and interpretative repertoires Wetherell and Potter, 1988) which take a more integrated stance towards traditions such as conversation analysis and poststructuralism.
Troubled and Untroubled Subject Positions
Post-structuralist theorists, with their more global view, rarely have their noses pressed up against the exigencies of talk-in-interaction. Rarely, are they called on to explain how their perspective might apply to what is happening right now, on the ground, in this very conversation. Theoretical concepts emerge in abstract on the basis of often implicit assumptions about the nature of interaction, language or social life. The notion of subject position explicated by Mouffe (1992) above is a good example, and its paucity becomes apparent if we consider in detail just some of the many positionings of Aaron in the material in Appendix One in relation to formulations of the nature of the event ('four in one night') and the way in which these positions and formulations are made troubled or remain untroubled.
One useful way into such analysis As conversation analysis reminds us, Aaron's positioning of himself as drunk is highly occasioned and needs to be seen in the context of the surrounding conversational activities.
Nigel's request in Line 1 for an account ("tell me") makes a description conditionally relevant as an appropriate next turn (Schegloff, 1968) . Aaron, however, after registering what sounds like dismay at the emerging topic (Line 4), and after some interventions from Phil and Paul, demurs ("I don't know I was a bit drunk"). Such 'dispreferred responses' (see Pomerantz, 1984) usually come supplied with an account for 'non-compliance' and in this case the drunkenness provides the grounds. Phil's next utterance (Line 10) indicates that he also hears Aaron in this way since he uses his own sobriety as a credential (legitimated by Aaron) for why it might be appropriate for him to tell the story instead as a qualified witness. Indeed it turns out that this is one of those stories of prowess that may be better left to others to tell on one's behalf.
By now, however, several positions are already in play. Aaron's drunkenness has been laid on the table, while his laughter and "no::" in Line 4, Phil's urging ("go on") and Paul insistence on the importance of being "on the record" also establish a context and a range of positions for
Aaron as well as an audience in relation to the as yet enigmatic event.
As Antaki et al. (1996) note in relation to the identity work in some data they analyse: The context for what happened now becomes formulated as being part of or illustrative of a "good month" or a "good weekend". Such 'fortune' could, of course, either be presented as agentic and internally attributed (seen as a personal achievement) or externally attributed as 'luck'. As is typical in talk (Edwards and Potter, 1992) , both these possible, and potentially inconsistent, positionings emerge in the following discussion with Aaron later returning to the 'lucky' theme (see Line 160 in Extract Nine below) having raised it initially in Line 67 above and more directly owning his 'good fortune' in the conversation which follows Nigel's next intervention. Aaron re-frames the criticism he received ("stick") as "a good ego trip" and to demonstrate how he handled it he constructs a piece of hypothetical dialogue with an imagined interlocutor where the interlocutor challenges him ("Oh you got off with her"), Aaron responds in a forthright way ('Yep, I did, so what's your problem'), leaving the imagined challenger confused and at a loss ('oh er errr'). The context for the event as something Aaron can be personally proud of becomes more firmly established invoking an as yet untroubled identity. In Extract Eight below, Nigel, as interviewer, then attempts, in a complex discursive act, to repair a potential misreading of his earlier question in Line 76 -"is that good". His question leads to further formulations of Aaron's position. To summarise, multiple and potentially inconsistent subject positions are in play in this stretch of discourse for Aaron -he is drunk, lucky, on the pull, having a good month, on the moral low ground, engaged in mutual sex with young women who fancied a bit of rough, not intentionally going for it, his conduct is impressive and so on -indeed, this list does not exhaust all the positions evident in the complete discussion in the interview. The flow of interaction variously troubles and untroubles these positions. As we have seen, one formulation leads to a counter-formulation which is in turn resisted. In fact the question of how to evaluate Aaron's actions, as often happens in social life, remains unresolved and ambiguous, and these various threads and Aaron's 'portfolio' of positions remain available to be carried forward to the other contexts and conversations making up the 'long conversation' (Maybin, 1994) which is the sixth form common room culture.
Extract Six
Extract Seven
Extract Eight
Extract Nine
To evoke a further analytic concept from social psychology, some order can be placed on these various positions by noting that they fit within several recognisable broader interpretative repertoires available to the young men. The term interpretative repertoire is an attempt to capture the 'doxic' (Barthes, 1977) nature of discourse. An interpretative repertoire is a culturally familiar and habitual line of argument comprised from recognisable themes, common places and tropes (doxa) Wetherell and Potter, 1988; Wetherell et al. 1987) . The repertoires in the extracts above include male sexuality as performance and achievement, a repertoire around alcohol and disinhibition, and an ethics of sexuality as legitimated by relationships and reciprocity (Hollway, 1984 , calls this the 'have and hold' discourse). These interpretative repertoires comprise members' methods for making sense in this context -they are the common sense which organises accountability and serves as a back-cloth for the realisation of locally managed positions in actual interaction (which are always also indexical constructions and invocations) and from which, as we have seen, accusations and justifications can be launched. The whole argument does not need to be spelt out in detail. Rather, one fragment or phrase (e.g. 'on the pull', 'social guards were down') evokes for listeners the relevant context of argumentation -premises, claims and counterclaims.
What, then, is the significance of this analysis (carried out in line with the spirit of Schegloff's methodological principles if not with his concern for detail) for Mouffe's post-structuralist account of subject positions? Mouffe (1992) presents subject positions as constructed in discourse, the tenor of her account above makes discourse the constituting agent. She argues "we can ... conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of "subject positions" that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of overdetermination and displacement." (p.372). Subject positions, and thus the identities of participants in social life, are determined by discourses and in this sense are prior, already constituted, and could be read off or predicted from knowledge of the relevant discourse.
Mapped on to the material in Appendix One, this view has some cogency in the sense that Aaron and Phil's choice to position Aaron within a repertoire of male sexuality as performance and proud achievement constructs for him and for others a context which may have ramifications beyond his control or intention. He is certainly positioned. But, it also seems a misdescription to make discourse the active agent here. What more clearly fuels positioning is accountability or participants' orientations to their setting and the emergent conversational activities. It is also very clearly the case that what a subject position comes to be is only partly the consequence of which discourse it can be assigned to. We saw, for instance, that the invocation of positions and thus their significance and connotation is indeed local, highly situated, and occasioned. In effect, as Schegloff argues, the sense of an interaction depends on what kind of thing it is for participants. I do not wish to suggest, however, that critical discourse analysis should thus become Schegloff's 'technical' analysis or that I see 'technical' analysis as an initial necessary discipline which should be carried out before any other statement about a piece of discourse could apply.
As noted earlier, I see the 'discipline' as two-sided. A post-structuralist approach allows a perspective on talk which helps more thoroughly account for 'why this utterance here'.
Argumentative Threads
If the problem with post-structuralist analysts is that they rarely focus on actual social interaction, then the problem with conversational analysts is that they rarely raise their eyes from the next turn in the conversation, and, further, this is not an entire conversation or sizeable slice of social life but usually a tiny fragment. Schegloff's methodological principles are fitted for the analysis of small pieces of conversation in detail. His recommendation that critical analysts first perform a 'technical analysis' is impractical -there may well be, for instance, thousands of interruptions which could be analysed in any social psychological or ethnographic study of discourse such as our work on masculinity. But, more crucially, Schegloff's suggestion rests on an unnecessarily restricted notion of analytic description and participants' orientation.
Schegloff argues that analysts should not import their own categories into participants' discourse but should focus instead on participant orientations. Further, analytic claims should be demonstrable. Schegloff's notion of analytic description uncontaminated by theorists' categories does not entail, however, that no analytic concepts whatsoever will be applied, as the example of his own analyses demonstrate. Rather, concepts such as conditional relevance, for example, or the notion of accountability, or preferred and dispreferred responses are used to identify patterns in talk and to create an ordered sense of what is going on. Presumably
Schegloff would argue that this does not count as imposing theorists' categories on participants' orientations since such concepts are intensely empirical, grounded in analysis and built up from previous descriptive studies of talk. As already noted, the advantage for Schegloff of such an approach is that it gives scholarly criteria for correctness and grounds academic disputes, allowing appeals to the data, and it closes down the infinity of contexts The crucial issue here, for Schegloff, is the point at which analysis departs from evident participant orientations and one problem from a critical perspective is that Schegloff's sense of participant orientation may be unacceptably narrow. We have seen already that in practice for
Schegloff participant orientation seems to mean only what is relevant for the participants in this particular conversational moment. Ironically, of course, it is the conversation analyst in selecting for analysis part of a conversation or continuing interaction who defines this relevance for the participant. In restricting the analyst's gaze to this fragment, previous conversations, even previous turns in the same continuing conversation become irrelevant for the analyst but also, by dictat, for the participants. We do not seem to have escaped, therefore, from the imposition of theorists' categories and concerns.
Any piece of discourse analysis, of course, will involve restrictions on what is studied.
Conversation analysis is not alone in this. If we adopt, however, Laclau and Mouffe's more inclusive notion of the 'argumentative texture' of the social and definition of discourse as the unceasing human activity of making meaning, a more productive sense of participant orientation and relevance is possible. Analysis works by carving out a piece of the argumentative social fabric for closer examination -a set of similar seeming conversational activities, say. Schegloff's approach demands that analysts then lose interest in the argumentative threads which run through this set as warp and woof connecting it in again with the broader cloth. The genealogical approach in contrast suggests that in analysing our always partial piece of the argumentative texture we look also to the broader forms of intelligibility running through the texture more generally. This is what Shapiro (1992) means by the concept of 'proto conversations' -the conversational or discursive history which makes this particular conversation possible.
With this tack, of course, we haven't solved Schegloff's problem of infinite relevance but, in practice, participants' orientations understood in this more inclusive way turn out to be manageable. As good ethnography of communication demonstrates (e.g. Cicourel, 1992; Lindstrom, 1992; Ochs, 1992) it is not necessary to say everything about the argumentative fabric of a society to say something, and something furthermore which is scholarly, complete, and insightful concerning participant orientations, and which takes those orientations as constructed by more than what is immediately relevant or set by the previous few turns in the conversation.
This point can be developed in another way. In effect, what is at stake is two approaches to what counts as an adequate answer to the question -why this utterance here? For Schegloff, for example, the material in Appendix One is adequately analysed when we have described the principal conversational activities and shown how participants' utterances contribute to and are occasioned by those activities. From my perspective, however, this is not an adequate
account. An adequate analysis would also trace through the argumentative threads displayed in participants' orientations and would interrogate the content or the nature of members' methods for sense-making in more depth.
Why, for instance, does Aaron respond to Paul's accusation that he is "on the pull" with an argument which formulates the young women involved as also wanting casual sex (Lines 163 -73), thus attempting to make his own actions as no longer "a right geeky thing to do"? Why, in this community, among these members, might this possibly work as an adequate justification? Why is this assumed to be a possible 'good defence'? It is important and interesting from a feminist perspective that these young men only appeal to some notion of autonomous female sexuality at this point in their conversation. Indeed, why is Paul's intervention heard in the first place as a critique which deserves answer? Why in this community does it seem to trouble identity to "be on the pull" but multiple sexual encounters can be also successfully framed as "good".
We should also be interested in the 'heteronormativity' (Kitzinger, personal communication) evident throughout this discussion which supplies a further taken for granted discursive backcloth organising these young men's participant orientations and their members' methods for making sense. A more adequate analysis of 'why this utterance here' would also explore the silences and the absences in this material -the argumentative threads which are hearably not part of these participants' orientations and everyday sense-making. Crucially, it would be concerned with the ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988 , see also Billig, 1987 evident in the struggle and collaboration over how to formulate Aaron and his actions. The movement of contextualisation and the troubling of positions gives some insight into the contradictory and inconsistent organisation of the broader interpretative resources these young men are actively working over as they try to negotiate both 'good' and 'geeky'. Surely a complete or scholarly analysis would try and clarify, interpret and discuss these resources.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to develop a critique of both post-structuralist writers on discourse and Schegloff's methodological prescriptions for analysts. I have argued that a focus on participants' orientations can be extremely revealing about the formation of subject positions.
Such a perspective substantially changes our view of the subject constituted by discourse and his or her 'ensemble' of subject positions. I have also tried to suggest, however, that in accusing critical discourse analysts of intellectual hegemony, Schegloff is performing his own act of colonisation in seeking to impose one narrow understanding of participants' orientations and relevance on the field as a whole. A further central aim was to intervene in the construction within social psychology of contrasting camps of discourse analysts and to suggest further reasons for preferring a more eclectic and approach.
What role, then, do I see for Schegloff's technical analysis? Is it, as he proposes, a first step in the long process of genealogical analysis or other kinds of critical discourse analyses focused on socio-political issues? My aim was not to endorse this division of labour -conversation analysis then ethnomethodology then post-structuralist analysis or ethnography of communication or critical discourse analysis -but to suggest that for social psychological discursive projects a more synthetic approach is required focused on the development of analytic concepts which work across some of these domains such as, for instance, the notion of positioning, interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas, and so on.
More specifically, critical discursive social psychology is that discipline which focuses on the situated flow of discourse, which looks at the formation and negotiation of psychological states, identities and interactional and intersubjective events. It is concerned with members' methods and the logic of accountability while describing also the collective and social patterning of background normative conceptions (their forms of articulation and the social and psychological consequences). It is a discipline concerned with the practices which produce persons, notably discursive practices, but seeks to put these in a genealogical context. It could be evaluated using Schegloff's 'gold standard' -empirical demonstrability -but other conventional criteria for evaluating scholarship are also relevant such as coherence, plausibility, validity, and insight especially as analysts include, as I believe they should, investigation of the social and political consequences of discursive patterning. 
Appendix One
